PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS UNDER RULE 56(a)

Even where a defendant admits facts in his answer which show that
he is liable for a measurable part of the plaintiff's claim, federal courts
have rarely entered judgment for that amount until the full trial has
been completed. In spite of rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that "a party seeking to recover upon a claim
. . . may ... move for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof,"1 plaintiffs have been denied the use of money admittedly due them. The possibility of forcing a settlement for less than
the court would eventually award, and the desire to retain use of the
money during the several years that the case may be in the courts, prompt
defendants to refuse payment. 2 Thus money due on sales contracts,3
insurance claims, 4 loans,5 or salaries, 6 for example, can be withheld from
deserving plaintiffs for long periods of time.
In Bamberger Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. William Irving Hamilton,
Inc.,7 rule 56(a) was properly applied. The plaintiff sought payment for
three months of radio advertising and defendant conceded that one
1 FrD. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). "Partial summary judgment," as used in'
this comment, refers to the granting of judgment on a portion of a single claim. It is
not used to refer to the granting of judgment on a single claim where more than one
claim is presented in a case.
2 Rule 56(b) provides that defendants may move for summary judgment as to "all
or any part" of a claim. This comment focuses on partial summary judgments for
plaintiffs since the only time a defendant really needs a partial judgment, as opposed to
a pre-trial order, is when his credit is impaired because of a large pending suit. If he
can get judgment in his favor on part of the suit, his credit as well as state of mind may
improve. The analysis of doctrinal arguments herein applies equally to rules 56(a)
and (b).
3 Liberty Die & Button Mould Corp. v. Consolidated Button & Buckle Corp., 160
N.Y.S.2d 728 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Plaintiff shipped $137.50 worth of merchandise to defendant, who returned a portion and asked for a $35.00 credit. Plaintiff issued only a
$30.00 credit. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment
for $100 since that amount was not in controversy. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 114 specifically
authorizes such partial judgments; see note 43 infra.
4 Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry Tent & Awning Co., 266 F.2d 200 (7th Cir.
1959).
5 Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. De Giacomo, 23 Misc. 2d 270, 206 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup.
Ct. 1960). Partial summary judgment was entered for the face amount of the notes and
the question of interest rates was held over for trial.
6 Sloane v. Land, 16 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The employee sued the employer for
$2,600, and $2,100 liability was admitted. The court refused to enter partial summary
judgment.
7 33 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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month's charges were due. Partial summary judgment was entered, and
the plaintiff was free to have execution for the single month's charges.
8
Likewise, the plaintiff in McDonald v. Batopilas Mining Co., an
attorney who had represented the defendant before the Mexican Claims
Commission, sought twenty per cent of the money awarded by that body.
The defendant answered that there was a ten per cent statutory limit
on attorney's fees. The court entered partial summary judgment for
ten per cent of the award-the amount for which liability was admitted
-and ordered trial as to the remainder. While there was no mention of
the federal rule under which the judgment was entered, it properly fits
within 56(a).9
But since 1948, the date of McDonald, there has been no federal decision of record granting partial summary judgment.' 0 To the contrary,
there have been numerous holdings, citing neither McDonald nor
Bamberger, that the federal rules do not permit partial judgments."
One group of cases reads rule 56(a) in terms of rule 56(d) or 54(b). For
example, when the 0. Henry Co. alleged fire damages of $32,000, its
insurance company offered only 514,000 on the grounds that 0. Henry
had failed to meet the reporting requirements of the policy. Partial
summary judgment was entered in favor of 0. Henry for $14,000 and
the insurance company immediately appealed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry Tent & Awning Co.,12
relying on its previous decision in Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works.' 3 In
8 8 F.R.D. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
9 It is not clear whether payment was immediately made in Barnberger and
McDonald. It is possible that execution was not sought for fear it would adversely
affect any settlement that was in the offing. Considerations of this type are always factors
in deciding whether to seek and execute a partial summary judgment.
10 A district court in Pennsylvania entered a partial summary judgment in 1948.
Though the case is unreported, it is mentioned in Coffman v. Federal Labs., Inc., 171
F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 1948). There is also an earlier decision in the Southern District of
New York that purportedly granted partial summary judgment. The case, however, is
unclear and may involve five separate claims such that the judgment entered would
have been on a whole claim. Tractor & Equip. Corp. v. Chain Belt Co., 50 F. Supp.
1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
11 Rabekoff v. Lazere & Co., 823 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1963); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v.
0. Henry Tent & Awning Co., 266 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1959); New Hampshire Fire Ins.
Co. v. Perkins, 30 F.R.D. 382 (D. Del. 1962); Sloane v. Land, 16 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
12 266 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1959).
13 154 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1946). The court also cited Coffman v. Federal Labs., Inc.,
171 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1948) (issue whether partial summary judgment which had been
entered and satisfied had res judicata effect on any of the remaining issues between
the parties; court held it did not, and by way of dicta expressed the view that partial
summary judgments are not permitted). Coffman in turn relied on .Biggins. The court
in 0. Henry also cited Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir.
1942) (held merely that a partial summary judgment entered under 56(d) was a pre-
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Biggins, the plaintiff salesman had sought money due him as sales representative for the defendant. The claim consisted of five items of back
salary and plaintiff moved for summary judgment on two. Supporting
affidavits were submitted, and after the defendant's failure to answer,
the court entered partial summary judgment. On appeal the Biggins
court concluded that rule 56 "does not contemplate a summary judgment
for a portion of a single claim in a suit."'14 It produced a curious argument: since rule 56(d) provides for a pre-trial order, rule 56(a) must
provide for no more. 15
Authority for this proposition was conspicuously wanting, 16 and it
cannot stand analysis. Rule 56(d) reads:
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the
court . . . shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy.... It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that [are not in controversy] ....
Rule 56(a) speaks of a "judgment," and rule 56(d) of an "order." It
seems likely that the draftsmen intended some difference. Indeed, according to the Advisory Committee Notes,' 7 the purpose of 56(d) is to provide
for a pre-trial order whenever the court must deny a motion for summary judgment. Since the court must consider affidavits and exhibits in
passing upon the motion for summary judgment, 8 rule 56(d) allows it
to reap some benefit from the time expended by narrowing the issues
and shortening the eventual trial. Rule 56(d), then, is concerned with
limiting the issues for that portion of the case that remains after the
motion for summary judgment under 56(a) has been ruled upon. The
trial order and hence not appealable); Porter v. American Tobacco Co., 7 F.R.D. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (relying on Biggins; held that partial summary judgments could not
be entered and confined its discussion to rules 56(d) and 54(b)); Audi Vision, Inc. v.
RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943) (held that where there is a claim and a
counterclaim which depend on the same underlying facts, the dismissal of either one
alone is not a final decision).
14 154 F.2d at 216.
15 Ibid.

16 Biggins cited no cases in support of its position. On this point, 0 Henry cited
Pasquel v. Owen, 97 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (partial summary judgment as to
liability could not be granted on the basis of evidence taken .at a previous trial, since
the appellate court had ordered a complete new trial); Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music
Enterprises, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (partial summary judgment denied
under rule 54(b) for amount of settlement offer with no discussion as to the applicability
of 56(a)); Wilbur v. Ford, 89 F. Supp. 407 (D. Mass. 1950) (partial judgment not allowed
under rule 56(d) for the amount of a7 surety bond, relying on Biggins, Coffman, and
Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943)).
17 Noms oF THE ADvisoRy CoMmrrrEE ON RULES, 28 U.S.C. at 3317 (1946).
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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Biggins-O. Henry position in effect rewrites rule 56; it improperly replaces the right to execution and payment provided by 56(a) with the
merely provisional remedies of 56(d). 19
A second argument implicit in Biggins and 0. Henry is that, prior to
completion of a case, rule 54(b) is the sole determinant of when judgment
may be entered. The rule states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action
... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment. as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay....
Since this rule provides for judgment on "one or more" claims the
Seventh Circuit drew the negative inference that judgment is not permitted on a portion of a claim. It drew the further inference that the
language authorizing partial summary judgments in 56(a) was to be
ignored because it had not been repeated in 54(b). Nothing in the
federal rules supported this proposition, and there was no precedent for it.
A state court 20 has suggested that first, if final judgment for partial
relief may be granted freely under 56(a), there is no need for 54(b), and
second, it would be unreasonable freely to permit partial summary judgments under 56(a) while they are limited to special conditions under
54(b). The first argument completely ignores that 54(b) applies to all
multiple claim situations while rule 56 deals only with summary judgments. The second argument fails because it overlooks the basic similarity of purpose between the two rules. Under 54(b) the court may
enter a final judgment by stating that there is no just reason for delay.
If the judge does not want to enter a final judgment he may enter an
"order . . . [which] is subject to revision at any time before the entry
" This is precisely the
of judgment adjudicating all the claims. . . ...

alternative that a court has under rule 56. If the judge wishes to enter
a final judgment, he can do so under 56(a); if he does not, he can enter
an order under 56(d) that is likewise subject to revision before completion of the trial. 21 The only distinction between the two rules on this
19 The 56(d) order differs significantly from a partial summary judgment, since it is
not final, not subject to execution, and may be revised at any time prior to the close of

the trial.
20 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Young, 162 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
21 Where summary judgment is granted on a single claim, in a multiple claim
situation, certification under 54(b) has been required to make the judgment appealable.

Hence there is the asymetrical situation that a certificate is required for summary
judgment on a whole claim while there is no similar requirement for judgment on a

partial claim. It would be more reasonable to exclude summary judgments entirely
from the provisions of 54(b) since a judge's decision to enter a judgment under 56(a)
rather than an order under 56(d) is tantamount to saying that there is no just reason

for delay.
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point, then, is the requirement in rule 54(b) of a formal certificate,
the main function of which is to provide certainty as to whether -a final
judgment has been entered. 22 This distinction certainly does not justify
saying 56(a) must be read in light of 54(b).
In its recent decision in Rabekoff v. Lazere & Co.,2 3 the Second Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit's whole approach and opened a different line of attack against partial summary judgment5. The court
said that a partial summary judgment is not a "final decision from which
an appeal may be taken ....
-24 Essentially, it argued that regardless
of the provisions of the federal rules, the requirements of section 1291
must be independently satisfied. 25 Thus, if partial summary judgments
are not final decisions, they are not appealable and are really only interlocutory orders.
The weakness in the Rabekoff argument is the presumption that
"final decision" has a readily ascertainable meaning, and that it imposes
a rigid standard upon the courts. The "final judgment" rule, as it is
popularly known, was stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Collins v.
Miller:26 "the rule requires that the judgment to be appealable should
be final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter
and as to all the causes of action involved."27 This traditional view
treats each case as a single judicial unit, and no appeal is permitted
without full and complete disposition of the case.
But while the "final judgment rule" has been on the books since
1789,28 the courts have not always felt bound by its traditional meaning.
As early as 1848 the Supreme Court allowed an appeal in Forgay v.
Conrad,29 where execution had been ordered on a partial judgment,
because it would have been unjust to subject the defendant to seizure
of his property without the right to be heard on appeal. The Forgay
See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950).
323 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1963).
24 Id. at 867. Rule 56(a) was not directly involved in this case. Partial summary
judgment was entered, and the trial judge certified under 54(b) because he thought that
multiple claims were involved. The Second Circuit held that there was only a single
claim involved and that the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), forbade partial
judgments on a single claim. But the statement that the trial courts in Biggins and
0. Henry had exceeded their jurisdiction makes it clear that the Second Circuit would
have reached the same result if the judgment had been entered under 56(a).
25 In case of an open conflict between the federal rules and the Judicial Code on
the question of appellate court jurisdiction, the latter prevails. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
26 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
27 Id. at 370.
28 1 Stat. 84 (1789).
29 47 U.S. (6 How.) 200 (1848).
22
23
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principle has shown great vitality and has been continually reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court 30 and the lower courts.31 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
explained:
In short, the rationale of these cases is that a judgment directing
immediate delivery of physical property is reviewable and is to
be deemed dissociated from a provision for an accounting even
though that is decreed in the same order. In effect such a con32
troversy is a multiple litigation ....
In other words, where the court divides the payment of damages into
two parts it creates two separate judicial units for purposes of the
final decision rule. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 33 the Court
saw "a need for relaxing the restriction upon what should be treated
as a judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction."3 4 More recently
the Court noted that the final judgment rule must be given a "practical
rather than a technical construction." 35 Section 1291 does nothing
more than impose a requirement on the courts to define "final decision."
There is nothing about rule 56(a) which is inconsistent.
However, the doctrinal arguments may merely mask a judicial ap30 Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 549 (1963); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 308 (1962); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey,
351 U.S. 427, 432 (1956); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 125
(1945); Gulf Refining Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 125, 136 (1925); Hill v. Chicago &
Evanston R.R., 140 U.S. 52, 54 (1891); Farmers Loan & Trust Co., Petitioner, 129 U.S.
206, 213 (1889); Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U.S. 180, 183 (1883); Thomson v.
Dean, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 342 (1868); Bronson v. Radiroad Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 524, 531
(1862).
31 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 1963); Kasishke v.
Baker, 144 F.2d 384, 385 (10th Cir. 1944); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. George, 69
F.2d 871, 877 (3d Cir. 1934), revtd on other grounds, 293 U.S. 378 (1935); In re Michigan
Central R.R., 124 Fed. 727, 731 (6th Cir. 1903); City of Eau Claire v. Payson, 107 Fed.
552, 557 (7th Cir. 1901); Bergh v. Ceballos, 61 Fed. 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1894).
32 Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126 (1945).
33 351 U.S. 427 (1956). Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Court, has said that the
purpose of § 1292 of the Judicial Code is to "allow appeals from orders other than
final judgments when they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). In effect,
the Court said that Congress never intended the "final judgment" rule to be binding
in situations where it will work an injustice. See Local 438, Construction Union v.
Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); McDonnell v. Birrell, 321 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1963).
34 351 U.S. at 432. Professor Moore has taken the position that the court is free to
define "final decision" in any way that pleases it. MOORE, JUDIcAL CODE 517 (1949).
However, Professor Moore does not believe that partial summary judgments under rule
56(a) are appealable. He believes that only a pre-trial order in the nature of rule 56(d)
is contemplated by rule 56(a). 6 MOORE, FEDmtERAL PAcrscE § 56.20[4], at 2311 (2d ed.
1953). The difficulty with this position is discussed in note 16 supra and accompanying
text.
35 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964), citing Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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prehensiveness that granting partial summary judgments would result
in a flood of additional appeals. For example, partial summary judgments
have been termed "obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice," 36
and numerous courts have announced a policy against "piecemeal
appeals."'37 However, under current law Congress permits appeals from
interlocutory orders in suits involving injunctions, 38 admiralty cases, 39
receiverships, 40 patent infringements, 41 and any case where the judge
feels there is a controlling issue of law, the determination of which will
speed the outcome of the litigation. 42 Further, federal rule 54(b) allows
appeals where judgment has been entered on one but less than all
claims and the judge sees no just reason for delay. Likewise, the Forgay
line of cases has permitted many additional appeals. Experience under
43
these exceptions and in the states that permit partial judgments
makes it seem unlikely that partial summary judgments would cause
a significant increase in appeals.
Practical considerations facing the respective parties reinforce this
view. Plaintiffs would only seek partial summary judgments when, first,
the amount admitted is a substantial portion of the total claim. Thus,
if the claim is for $10,000 and it is clear that partial judgment can be
obtained for $9,000, the plaintiff may seek partial judgment; if he is
certain to get only $100, however, the partial judgment would not
compensate for delaying the trial. Second, he would only seek partial
judgment when the full trial promises to take considerable time; the
36 Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry Tent & Awning Co., 266 F.2d 200,
Cir. 1959).
37 Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339 (1913); United
Girault, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 21 (1850); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. 0. Henry
Awning Co., 273 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1959); In the Matter of Heddendorf,
887, 889 (1st Cir. 1959).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958).
39 Ibid.

201 (7th
States v.
Tent &
263 F.2d

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.

Ibid.
New York has permitted partial summary judgments for a number of years.
See, e.g., Sheehan v. Andrew Cone Gen. Advertising Agency, 176 Misc. 882, 29 N.Y.S.2d
317 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Michigan and Illinois, prior to their recent adoption of the federal
rules, both provided for partial summary judgments. Mich. Ct. R. 30(5) (1945); 2 ILL.
LAWs 1941 at 464. Illinois will permit partial summary judgments under its new rule
which is identical to 56(a). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 56 (1963); ILL. SuP. Cr. R. 16.
Michigan has had no cases under its new rules so it is difficult to predict its future course.
Several states have adopted the federal rules, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36; MINN. R. Civ. P.
56; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56, and federal court decisions may be persuasive in the state
interpretations. The Biggins-O. Henry view has already made itself felt in Florida.
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Young, 162 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
42
43
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longer the prospective trial, the more desirable the partial judgment.
Finally, the plaintiff would consider how badly he needed the money.
From the standpoint of the court, there would properly be reluctance
to enter partial judgments except in clear-cut cases. Where the judge
has doubt whether material issues are in controversy, he can enter a
pre-trial order under 56(d) and reserve the right to revise the order
during the trial.
If treated this way, even where partial summary judgment has been
entered it is unlikely that many would be appealed. The defendant
who has admitted liability, as in 0. Henry, would have no issues on
which to base an appeal. Where the defendant has not formally
admitted liability, but his answers and affidavits nonetheless make
liability clear, there would likewise be little incentive for him to
throw money away appealing. He might appeal solely for purposes
of delay, but the cost of the appeal would in most cases certainly outweigh the value to him of a short-term delay in paying the partial
44
amount.
Of course even if rule 56(a) is construed to permit partial summary
judgments, there may be cases where the plaintiff's counsel will believe
it unwise to invoke it. He may believe that routine negotiations, rather
than financial pressure, will lead to a higher settlement. Thus he may
prefer not to have a hostile act like execution of the partial judgment
interfere with the rapport between the defense counsel and himself. This
attitude would be reinforced if his client had money to tide himself
over until completion of the suit. But cases like 0. Henry show that
there are cases in which plaintiffs do want partial summary judgment.
How many more would have been sought but for the prevailing rule
cannot be estimated, but where partial summary judgment is desired
there is no valid reason for the courts to refuse to grant it. Its use
should accelerate the course of justice without overly taxing the judicial
machinery.
44 One objection that might be raised is that the defendant's answers will simply
become more evasive in order to avoid admission, thus dissipating the anticipated

benefit from partial summary judgments. This is unlikely for two reasons. First, in
hearing a motion for summary judgment the court also considers depositions, answers
to interrogatories and affidavits in accord with rule 56(c). It would require more
than simply rewording the answer to create an issue of material fact. Second, the
courts could control the problem of evasive pleadings through stricter use of rule 11,
which requires attorneys to certify that pleadings are not interposed for delay and

authorizes the court to take "appropriate disciplinary action."

